Using data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey, this study compares household spending on different goods by insured versus uninsured households, controlling for total spending and demographic characteristics. The analysis shows that uninsured households, on average, spend more on housing, food, alcohol, and tobacco compared to insured households. These results suggest that both prices and preferences, in addition to income, help explain why some households do not buy coverage; the findings also raise the possibility that the uninsured may lack coverage in part because they face higher prices for basic needs like housing and food.
Surprisingly little research has used an economic framework to analyze why some households do not have health insurance. Most of the literature on the uninsured emphasizes the demographic characteristics of the uninsured, rather than the economic constraints and choices that determine coverage. Since the purchase of health insurance is voluntary, coverage represents a trade-off for households between insurance and other goods. The economics of this trade-off are governed by income, prices, and preferences. In this framework, understanding why people are uninsured means knowing the extent to which each of these factors is responsible for the failure to purchase insurance.
The design of appropriate public policy aimed at the uninsured depends critically on understanding the relative importance of these three factors. Suppose, for example, that the main reason some households do not have health insurance is that their incomes are low and they place basic needs like food and shelter ahead of health insurance. In such a situation, the debate about covering the uninsured is fundamentally about equity and redistribution; there is no market failure. If government intervention were called for, the appropriate policy response would be to redistribute resources to the poor through either cash or in-kind transfers.
Alternatively, suppose that most of the uninsured do not buy insurance because information asymmetries in the insurance market mean that they face actuarially unfair prices. Government intervention that corrects this market failure will increase social welfare. This inefficiency can be addressed using the same regulatory tools that are applied to the market for automobile insurance: mandates to purchase coverage combined with government-sponsored pools to insure high-risk individuals. Proposals to mandate coverage also typically include subsidies to low-income households, suggesting that policymakers believe some combination of prices and incomes are responsible for the lack of health insurance coverage.
Another way in which price differences may help explain lack of insurance coverage concerns whether the uninsured face higher prices than the insured for other goods. For example, suppose that some households face higher housing prices than others, and that the need to pay the rent or meet mortgage payments squeezes health insurance out of their budgets. If this is the reason why some households are uninsured, it is not obvious what policy response is most appropriate. Clearly, regulation of health insurance markets misses the point. Income redistribution or policies directed at the housing market would be more likely to affect the number of uninsured in this case.
If prices and income cannot explain why some households do not have insurance, the only remaining explanation that economists have to offer is that preferences must differ. For example, one explanation for the fact that some households buy health insurance and some do not is differences in risk aversion. Households also may differ in their preferences for other goods; some households may choose private schools for their children, annual family vacations, or nicer homes over having health insurance. If differences in preferences are responsible for variations in insurance coverage, it is not clear that any policy intervention is justified.
1 Moreover, it can be difficult to distinguish differences in preferences from differences in prices. For example, is living in a city, and facing high housing prices as a result, a reflection of preferences, or an exogenous difference in prices? Stigler and Becker (1977) have argued that it is, in general, impossible to distinguish analytically between these two possibilities; any hypothesized difference in preferences can be modeled as a difference in prices. Therefore we should consider carefully any reasonable explanation that relies on income or prices to explain variation in insurance coverage, using differences in preferences only as the explanation of last resort.
In this paper, we focus on understanding whether prices or preferences explain why one household buys insurance while another with the same total budget does not. To shed light on this question, we compare the spending patterns of uninsured households to those of insured households with similar total expenditures and other characteristics. The logic behind this exercise is that we can infer from these patterns how prices facing the insured and uninsured would have to differ if they were to explain the observed differences in spending between the two groups; we can assess whether the hypothesized price differences seem plausible. Moreover, while the prices individual households face are difficult to observe directly, we have very good data on household spending patterns.
Our comparison of spending patterns reveals that uninsured households, on average, spend more than comparable insured households on housing, food, alcohol, and tobacco. These results suggest that both prices and preferences, in addition to income, help explain why some households do not buy coverage; they also raise the possibility that the uninsured may lack coverage in part because they face higher prices for basic needs like housing and food. If this is the case, then policies focusing only on the market for health insurance may be insufficient to address the problem of the uninsured.
Background
As we already have mentioned, in a simple economic model, the amount of a good purchased is determined by income, prices (of all goods), and preferences. Bundorf and Pauly (2006) present compelling evidence that income alone does not determine whether a household buys insurance -indeed, it is not even as important as one might have expected. They document that health insurance is affordable for most uninsured individuals in the sense that: 1) if the uninsured bought insurance, they still would have enough income left over to avoid poverty (what Bundorf and Pauly call the ''normative'' definition of affordability); or 2) most other households at their level of income have insurance (Bundorf and Pauly's ''behavioral'' definition of affordability). They make a convincing case that most uninsured house-holds have enough income to afford insurance. The question then is: why don't they have coverage? In our framework, answering this question means untangling the roles of prices and preferences in the insurance purchase decision, holding total resources constant.
A number of studies have explored how prices affect health insurance coverage. Before considering the results of these studies, it is worth noting a few important distinctions. The first is between the price of health insurance and the price of other goods. Without exception, existing studies of the relationship between prices and health insurance coverage focus on the price of health insurance. The second distinction, which applies to discussions of the price of health insurance, is between prices that are actuarially unfair and prices that are actuarially fair but high relative to income. Most existing studies of prices and health insurance discuss prices in the second sense. That is, they consider whether the overall increase in the level of health insurance prices helps explain the overall decline in coverage, rather than whether information asymmetries in the insurance market cause some consumers to drop out of the market. The third and final set of distinctions concerns how to measure the overall ''price'' of health insurance. Is the correct measure of price the expected benefit or the administrative load on that benefit? Is it the employee's share of the premium or the total premium? This issue is discussed at length by Chernew, Cutler, and Keenan (2005) ; we do not discuss this issue here except to note that it is a point of debate in this area of the literature.
A number of studies examine the relationship between the (total) price of health insurance and coverage (Chernew, Frick, and McLaughlin 1997; Cutler 2003; Chernew, Cutler, and Keenan 2005; Gruber and Washington 2005) . These studies yield estimates of the elasticity of coverage with respect to price that are generally quite low, which undermines the idea that the uninsured lack coverage because of the high price of insurance. Evidence on the role of adverse selection in insurance markets is mixed. Two relatively recent studies find no evidence of adverse selection in the health insurance market as a whole (Cardon and Hendel 2001; Bajari, Hong, and Khwaja 2006) ; on the other hand, earlier studies, many of which focus on adverse selection in plan choice from among a menu of plans rather than on the margin of having insurance versus being uninsured, do conclude that there is adverse selection (see Cutler and Zeckhauser 2000 for a review). The methods in these papers all differ, so perhaps the most one can say at this point is that we do not really know to what extent actuarially unfair prices for insurance may be responsible for lack of coverage.
To our knowledge, there are no studies that have examined how the prices of other goods affect the probability of insurance coverage. It is easy to imagine that health insurance is an item that might be ''squeezed out'' of household budgets by more pressing needs. Indeed, Yegian et al. (2000) report that 60% of respondents to a survey of California's nonpoor uninsured (family income more than twice the poverty level) agree with the statement, ''I worry a lot about not having health insurance for others in my family;'' however, only 41% agree that ''health insurance ranks very high on my list of priorities for where to spend my money.'' In other words, they may worry about not having health insurance, but other things take precedence. The fact that health insurance is a lumpy and heavily regulated good-it may be difficult to buy just a little bit of health insurance-exacerbates this problem.
To summarize, our reading of the existing literature suggests three things. First, that income alone does not explain the fact that some households have health insurance and some do not. Second, the evidence on the role of the price of health insurance in explaining lack of health insurance coverage is mixed. Third, although there has been no work attempting to determine how the prices of other goods affect health insurance coverage, simple economic theory predicts that they should matter. One of the goals of our analysis is to put health insurance coverage in the context of all the other spending decisions that a household must make and see whether higher prices of other goods may help explain why some households are uninsured. Each household is interviewed up to four times at three-month intervals. Three months of expenditure data are collected retrospectively at each quarterly interview for a total of 12 months of expenditure data. For each household, we have between one and four observations on detailed quarterly expenditures. We average these quarterly expenditures over however many observations are available so that there is one observation per household. We multiply average quarterly spending by four to get average annualized spending and inflate all dollar amounts to 2006 dollars using the Consumer Price Index.
Methods

Data
Expenditure categories. The CE gathers data on expenditures in hundreds of detailed categories. We analyze the data aggregated into 18 broad categories: 1) housing (mortgage interest and principal payments, rent, property taxes, insurance, and home improvements); 2) food consumed at home; 3) food consumed away from home (i.e., at restaurants); 4) transportation (cars purchased outright, interest and principal payments on car loans, car leases, other private transportation expenses, fuel, car repairs, car insurance, public transportation expenses); 5) utilities; 6) furniture and appliances; 7) clothing; 8) entertainment; 9) health insurance; 10) medical care; 11) education and reading; 12) alcohol; 13) tobacco; 14) household services (child care, pest control, movers, etc.); 15) personal care; 16) life insurance; 17) retirement accounts and pensions; and 18) a residual category comprising all other goods.
We use ''outlays,'' as defined by Rogers and Gray (1994) , rather than the CE basic measures of spending as the outcome of interest in our main analysis. Outlays differ from the basic CE measure of spending primarily because they include the value of principal payments on home mortgages and car loans and exclude the purchase price of financed vehicles. 4 Outlays capture cash flows, which are intriguing from a descriptive perspective: what do people buy when they don't buy insurance? From the perspective of economic theory, it may be more interesting to analyze patterns of consumption. Consumption differs from outlays in two ways. First, loan principal payments are included in outlays but do not belong in consumption since they represent a form of saving. Second, outlays do not capture the value of service flows from durable goods like housing and cars. Thus, both outlays and consumption are interesting, but for different reasons. We use outlays as the dependent variable in our main analyses and present supplemental analyses of the consumption of housing and transportation.
Defining the uninsured. Each household in the CE reports the total number of health insurance policies held by individuals in the household in each quarter, and the number of household members covered by each policy. It is not possible to identify which individuals in a household are covered (either as dependents or as the policyholder) by a particular private policy. We consider households to be ''fully insured'' if in all waves they have at least one insurance policy that covers at least the number of people in the household. ''Partially insured'' households are defined as those that either have a policy covering only some household members, have insurance in some waves but not others, or report positive spending on health insurance but do not report details on any health insurance policies. We drop partially insured households from our main analysis; as discussed in more detail later, the results do not change much if we include these ''partially insured'' households with either the insured or the uninsured. Each household also reports which individuals are covered by Medicare and/or Medicaid in each wave; we drop from our sample households where anyone has public coverage (the majority are households in which the reference person is 65 or older). We consider households to be uninsured if they have no private or public health insurance.
Defining the sample for analysis. We begin with data on 52,182 households interviewed in the 2004 through 2006 panels of the CE. About one-fifth of the households in our sample (n 5 9,817) has a reference person 65 or older; we drop these. Ten percent of the remaining sample (n 5 4,379) has some public coverage so we drop them as well. About one-fifth of the sample that remains at this point (n 5 8,083) has partial health insurance coverage-that is, they are households that have either a health insurance policy which fails to cover everyone in the family, or they have had private coverage at one point in the year but not another. We similarly drop these households from the sample. Finally, we drop 247 observations that report negative average medical spending, and 708 observations that report no health insurance policies but do report positive spending on health insurance (the results are robust for including these observations with either the insured or uninsured rather than dropping them). The sample that remains consists of 28,948 households, of which 68% (n 5 19,743) are classified as insured and 32% (n 5 9,205) are uninsured. This is the sample that we use for our main analyses. All of the statistics and analyses we present in this paper are weighted using the sampling weights provided with the CE.
Specification
Our main analysis relies on a comparison of the spending patterns of uninsured and insured households that are similar in terms of demographics and budgets. Specifically, we estimate multivariate regressions controlling for household composition and demographics. For each of the 18 categories, we estimate a separate linear regression with the household's outlay (in real dollars) in that category as the dependent variable:
where j indexes the 18 expenditure categories, X is a vector of demographic and household composition controls, uninsured is a dummy variable equal to one if the household has no health insurance, STATE is a vector of state dummy variables, and year is a vector of year dummies. The demographic controls we use in our main analysis are age, gender, marital status, race (white versus nonwhite), and educational attainment of the household head (indicator variables for being a high school dropout, being a high school graduate, having some college, or being a college graduate). Including a quadratic in total outlays means that we are, in effect, comparing households with the same total budgets. We control for household composition by including separate variables for the number of male adults in the household, the number of female adults, the number of boys (ages 2 to 17), the number of girls (ages 2 to 17), the number of infants, and the number of earners (zero, one, two, or more) in the household. 5 The coefficient c on the uninsured dummy measures the average difference in spending on good j for an uninsured household compared to an insured household, holding constant total spending, demographics, and household composition. In this way, we can identify which goods comprise more of the budget of an uninsured household compared to an observably similar insured household. 6 Table 1 presents averages of demographic and household composition variables by insurance status. The significance of differences in characteristics between the insured and uninsured is noted in the table; all of the differences we discuss here are statistically significant. Consistent with existing studies such as that of the Institute of Medicine (2001), we find that the heads of uninsured households are younger, have lower educational attainment, and are more likely to be nonwhite than the heads of insured households. Uninsured households are more than twice as likely as insured households to have no earner (13% versus 5%). Not surprisingly, the uninsured are much poorer; their average total outlay is about half that of insured households ($28,812 versus $55,481). The great majority of uninsured households (78.5%) have total outlays below the unweighted sample median of $37,831, while only 38% of insured households are in this ''low spender'' category.
Results
Descriptive Findings
Uninsured households are also much more likely to have a reference person who does not work due to a disability (6.5% versus 1.5%). Still, the vast majority of uninsured households have at least one worker. Conditional on having an earner, heads in uninsured households are less likely to work in the public sector and are more likely to be selfemployed than are heads in insured house- holds. The most striking difference, however, may be that the uninsured are nearly twice as likely to be renters: 61.8% of the uninsured rent their homes, compared with only 28.3% of the insured. Table 2 presents information on how insured and uninsured households spend their money, both in real 2006 dollars and as a share of the household's total budget. We present results separately for low spenders (those in the bottom half of the annual total expenditure distribution of our sample) and high spenders (those in the top half). As noted previously, the low-spending group contains the majority of the uninsured, so these results can be thought of as describing the typical uninsured household, while the results for high spenders describe the unusual top quintile of uninsured who are relatively well-off. Compared to insured households, both low-and high-spending uninsured households spend a significantly larger fraction of their budgets on housing, food at home, utilities, clothing, and tobacco; highspending uninsured households spend significantly more on alcohol and transportation as well. The largest differentials in terms of dollars spent are for food and housing, and, for high spenders, transportation. The uninsured also spend a significantly smaller share of their total budgets on many goods besides health insurance-most notably retirement accounts and pensions.
To some extent, these differences in budget shares for insured versus uninsured households simply reflect the fact that some goods are necessities and some are luxuries. What we mean is that even after splitting the sample in two based on total outlays, the uninsured in each spending category have lower average total outlays than the insured; by definition, we would expect the lower-spending group to devote a larger share of their budgets to goods that are, empirically, necessities (food, housing) and a smaller share to luxuries (retirement savings). The multivariate analyses presented in the next section will address this problem by controlling for the household's total outlay-in effect, estimating the spending differential for insured versus uninsured households while holding the total budget constant. The regressions also control for other characteristics (age, family size and composition, and education of the household reference person) that drive the demand for health insurance and other goods and which may account for some of the differences observed in Table 2 .
Multivariate Results
In order to adjust for differences in total outlay and household characteristics between insured and uninsured households, we run multivariate regressions using the methods described earlier (see equation 1). We use these regressions to calculate the average difference in spending between insured and uninsured households for each of the 18 expenditure categories. We estimate these models separately for low spenders and high spenders. Table 3 presents the coefficient on the uninsured dummy and its standard error for each category of spending for both halves of the sample. Recall that the coefficient reported in the table corresponds to c in equation 1 and, conceptually, captures the average difference in spending on each good for an uninsured household compared to an insured one, holding other characteristics including total outlays constant. Complete regression results are available from the authors on request.
The results in Table 3 are generally consistent with the descriptive analysis of budget shares in the bottom panel of Table 2 . In particular, we find that for both high and low spenders, the big-ticket item on which uninsured households spend significantly more than their insured counterparts is housing: $507 more for low spenders and $1,266 more for high spenders. In both cases, this differential represents about 10% of baseline spending on housing ($5,347 for low spenders and $15,758 for high spenders, as shown in Table 2 ) or about 2% of total spending-a differential that is not only statistically significant but economically significant as well. The uninsured also spend significantly more on food at home (about $300, which represents about 10% of baseline food spending for low spenders).
As far as interpreting these results, consider the $507 differential in housing spending among low spenders. What might explain higher spending on housing among the uninsured? Perhaps uninsured families have a strong preference for housing and have larger homes than the insured (''let's add a master suite instead of buying health insurance''). We can rule this possibility out since the CE includes data on the number of rooms in a dwelling; uninsured families have significantly smaller homes (defined by number of rooms) on average than insured families, whether or not we adjust for other characteristics. Another possibility is that the homes of the uninsured are better on some other dimensions than those of the insured (''let's renovate the kitchen instead of buying health insurance''). We cannot rule this possibility out, but note that it seems implausible given that the homes of the uninsured are signifi-cantly smaller. The remaining possibility, and the one that seems most plausible to us, is that the uninsured face higher housing prices than the insured and therefore spend more on housing. 7 In the same way, higher food prices would explain their higher food spending. The possibility that poor households face higher prices for necessities such as food and housing has long been a subject for conjecture among urban economists. Empirical evidence in this area remains mixed (see, for example, Kaufman et al. 1997; Chung and Meyers 1999; Hayes 2000) , and as far as we know there has been no analysis of how this might affect their consumption of other goods. But our results are consistent with the idea that some households may face higher prices for basic needs-in particular, housing and food-which in turn puts health insurance out of their reach.
At the same time, our results suggest that this is not the only thing going on. As Table 3 shows, the uninsured spend more than the insured not just on housing and food, but on tobacco ($139 for low spenders, or about 60% of baseline spending) and alcohol ($31 for low spenders, or about 10% of baseline spending). This suggests that the uninsured simply have different preferences from the insured. Perhaps they are less health-oriented or discount future costs more heavily, either one of which would lead to less health insurance and more alcohol and tobacco.
8 There are also a number of goods besides health insurance on which low-spending uninsured households spend significantly less than their insured counterparts: most notably retirement accounts and pensions ($257), medical care ($80), life insurance ($50), and food away from home ($33). These differences, too, suggest that the uninsured have different preferences from the insured-in addition to any differences they may face in the price of basic needs.
Thus, the overall picture that emerges so far is one in which the uninsured spend more on the necessities of life-housing and foodwith a little bit extra set aside for vice. These results raise the interesting possibility that high housing prices may partially explain the fact that these households do not have health insurance. This is consistent with the popular notion that many households cannot afford insurance in the sense that paying the rent and putting food (plus perhaps a six-pack of beer and a pack of cigarettes) on the table come first. Next, we test the sensitivity of our results in a number of different ways: 1) imputing service flows for housing and transportation; 2) estimating differentials in saving; 3) investigating the implications of error in our measure of health insurance spending; 4) including additional controls in the multivariate results; 5) considering the possibility that the uninsured are in worse health and/or face higher prices for health insurance; 6) using income rather than total outlay as a control variable; and 7) using alternative approaches to define our sample of insured and uninsured households. We discuss each of these checks.
Consumption as an outcome: imputing service flows for housing and transportation. From a theoretical perspective, it may be more meaningful to look at consumption instead of outlays. A number of recent studies employ CE data to construct measures of consumption that are used as proxies for household well-being (Meyer and Sullivan 2003, 2007; Krueger and Perri 2006) . Following their example, we impute service flows for housing and transportation. In order to impute housing consumption, we replace reported home ownership expenses (mortgage interest and principal payments, property taxes, maintenance, and insurance) with the respondents' assessment of the current market rent for their home for homeowners and for those who occupy their homes rent-free. For renters, consumption is the same as their reported rent payments (i.e., the same as outlays). This ''rental equivalence'' approach is used by both Krueger and Perri (2006) and Meyer and Sullivan (2007) . We impute vehicle consumption following the approach of Krueger and Perri (2006) adapted for the fact that we use annualized rather than quarterly data. 9 We use these data to estimate a set of results analogous to those in Table 3 for housing and transportation but using consumption, rather than outlays, as the dependent variables. The results of this analysis for housing and transportation are presented in Table 4 . On average, consumption is considerably higher than outlays for all groups, as expected. There is, however, very little effect on the differentials in spending between insured and uninsured as a result of using consumption rather than outlays. 10 We conclude that our results are qualitatively similar whether we use outlays or consumption as the dependent variable.
What about savings? An omitted category of ''spending'' in our analysis is saving. One could argue that the uninsured might be accumulating assets for a rainy day instead of buying formal insurance (Starr-McCluer 
1996).
11 Are the uninsured in fact selfinsuring through saving? We have already documented that the uninsured contribute less, not more, to retirement accounts and pensions. The CE has limited information on other savings behavior; however, in a set of analyses not reported here but available on request from the authors, we use two other available measures of savings: 1) the difference between after-tax annual income and total annualized expenditures, and 2) the change in the amount held in checking accounts, savings accounts, bonds, and securities over the previous 12 months. Using either measure the story is the same: the uninsured do not save more than the insured. In fact, the evidence suggests that the uninsured save significantly less than the insured. As a result, we reject with some confidence the possibility that uninsured households in the CE are in fact ''selfinsuring'' through savings.
Measurement error in health insurance and medical care spending. Since the CE collects data on out-of-pocket spending only, both health insurance and medical care spending are certain to be undercounted for the insured because of employer-paid health insurance premiums and direct payments from insurers to medical providers. This has two implications for our analysis. First, the observed spending differentials in these two categories between the insured and the uninsured do not reflect the true differences in consumption. As long as we are primarily interested in other categories of spending (e.g., food and housing), this simply means that we should keep in mind that the estimated differentials for health insurance and medical care are likely to be biased.
12 Second, and more seriously, our measure of total spending will be systematically underestimated for the insured but not for the uninsured. This has the potential to bias our estimates of the insured/uninsured differential in other categories of spending, such as food and housing. This is because we effectively are comparing a richer insured household with a poorer uninsured household, even though both have the same observed total spending.
To bound the magnitude of this bias, we calculate an alternative set of estimates as follows. Since workers directly pay, on average, only about 20% of health insurance premiums with firms paying the remainder on their behalf (Krueger and Levy 1996) , we assume that total health insurance spending would actually be five times what we observe for each household in the CE. We re-estimate all the regressions using this alternative measure of health insurance spending and the higher level of total spending it implies. This adjustment does not substantially affect any of the results we already have reported, so we conclude that the understatement of health insurance and total spending for the insured is unlikely to be a significant source of bias.
What about including other covariates? In an additional set of analyses (also not reported here), we add controls for rural versus urban location, home ownership, sector of employment of the reference person, and disability of the household reference person. Note that it is not obvious that these controls ought to be included in these regressions since some could be considered household consumption choices. One household might choose to own a home in Ithaca, N.Y., for example, while another with the same total budget might choose to rent an apartment in Manhattan. The urban location controls we use are a set of dummies reflecting the size of the primary sampling unit (PSU) in which the household resides, combined with information on whether the household lives in a Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) and whether the household lives in an urban area as defined by the BLS. 13 These covariates seem likely to be correlated with the housing prices that the household faces.
The home ownership controls consist of dummies for whether the household owns a home without a mortgage, owns a home with a mortgage, rents, occupies a home rent-free, or lives in a dormitory. Two additional covariates are likely to be highly correlated with the price of health insurance that the household faces: sector of employment (including self-employment) of the reference person and a dummy indicating that the reference person does not work due to a disability. Self-employed individuals who wish to buy insurance must do so in the small group or individual markets, which typically have much higher administrative loading; disabled individuals face the additional burden of higher actuarially fair premiums even before the higher loading of the individual insurance market is added.
Surprisingly, the inclusion of any or all of these covariates changes the results very little (complete results are available upon request from the authors). Even with (admittedly imperfect) proxies for the price of housing and health insurance, the uninsured spend more than the insured primarily on housing and food, alcohol, and tobacco. If our results are driven by geographic variation in the price of housing or other goods, the relevant variation occurs at a finer level than the one observed here: not Manhattan versus Ithaca, but Manhattan versus Long Island.
What about differences in health status or health insurance premiums? One possibility for which we cannot fully account, and that is surely an important part of the story, is that the uninsured may face higher prices for health insurance. They may face higher prices that are actuarially fair because they are in worse health, which we do not observe in the CE; or they may face higher prices that are actuarially unfair, not resulting from differences in health status but, for example, from working in small firms.
Unfortunately, we do not observe these prices in the CE, nor do we have very good proxies for health status. Nonetheless, we believe that our analysis of spending differences shows that differences in health status and the price of health insurance cannot be the entire reason why many low-income households are uninsured. First, we do control for many of the factors that affect health insurance prices: geography, age, family size, employment, and, in supplementary analyses, self-employment and work disability of the household reference person. Second, and perhaps more convincingly, suppose that the entire reason why one household purchases insurance and another does not is a difference in health insurance prices. Assuming the households face the same prices for other goods and have otherwise similar preferences, the amount of money the uninsured household does not spend on insurance would be expected to be distributed across all the other goods the household buys, according to the marginal propensity to consume out of income. When we simulate the differentials in spending that arise if uninsured households allocate their ''extra'' money based on the average marginal propensity to consume (results available upon request), we do not get results that look like the ones in Table 3 . For example, we estimate that the marginal propensity to spend on housing among low spenders is about 24 cents out of each additional dollar of income. If the only difference between the insured and the uninsured in this group was that the uninsured lay out $764 less for health insurance, we would expect to observe the uninsured spending about $183 more (5 $764 * .24) on housing. Instead, we observe that they spend about $507 more.
14 We conclude that there must be other differences in either preferences or the prices of other goods, and not just differences in health or the price of health insurance, that explain this result.
Income rather than total outlays as a control. We also estimate a set of models using income, rather than total outlays, as a control. Income has much higher variance than total outlays and is lower than total outlays for many households (see Rogers and Gray 1994 for a discussion of the latter point, as well as BLS 2008b); in our sample, outlays exceed income for nearly half of the uninsured. The results using income as a control are more sensitive to other details of the specification than the results using total outlays, but overall the main results using income as a control are similar to those using total outlays.
Alternative ways of defining the uninsured sample. As noted in our discussion of the data, the results are also unaffected by different ways of categorizing households whose health insurance coverage changes over the course of the year. We can drop them altogether (the approach taken in our main analysis), categorize them based on their status at the beginning of the year, include them with the insured, or include them with the uninsured; the main results are unchanged.
We conclude based on all of these sensitivity checks that our results and conclusions are very robust to different specifications.
Discussion
What are the implications of these results for public policy? If some households are uninsured because high prices for other goods squeeze health insurance out of their budgets, then many of the policies that states have pursued to increase coverage, such as rate regulation in the small-group health insurance market, are doomed to fail. Indeed, our results may help to explain why these policies seem to have had so little effect (Simon 2004) . Our results also echo the recommendations of experts who have urged that poverty thresholds ought to take into account geographic variation in prices (Citro and Michael 1995) . A family with income twice the poverty level has much less to devote to health insurance, after paying for housing and food, if it lives in New York rather than Michigan. States have some latitude about where to set eligibility cutoffs for Medicaid and the State Children's Health Insurance Program (SCHIP); other programs, such as Food Stamps, rely on a national standard that does not vary within the 48 contiguous states. 15 We believe it is no coincidence that in the recent round of debates over reauthorization of SCHIP, the two states-New Jersey and New York-that wanted to raise their eligibility levels to 350% and 400% of the federal poverty level, respectively (beyond the level that was acceptable to the White House), are also states with some of the highest costs of living in the country.
More generally, policies aimed at reducing the number of uninsured people should consider more than just the price of insurance and ideally would be coordinated with other anti-poverty measures. Considering health insurance coverage alone yields an incomplete picture of the economic reality facing households that are on the margin of being uninsured. Research that will help inform better policy must take into account the full set of economic choices that households door don't-make.
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1 An exception is when we believe there are significant externalities associated with the lack of insurance (see Coate 1995 for a discussion). In this case, as noted earlier, some combination of mandates and subsidies would address the externality without imposing unfair costs on low-income households. 2 More formally, consider the relationship between health insurance and housing, for example. If housing is inelastically demanded with respect to its own price, higher housing prices will result in higher spending on housing and (if the compensated cross-price elasticity is either negative, or positive but smaller than the income effect of the price change) lower spending on health insurance as well. To put it more simply: housing and health insurance may be gross substitutes. 3 Technically, the unit of observation in the CE is the ''consumer unit,'' defined as household members who depend on one another and share expenses. Consumer units are in most cases the same as households, and we refer to them here as households for ease of exposition. 4 The CE documentation (BLS 2006; BLS 2007; BLS 2008a) refers to this outcome as ''expenditure outlays.'' 5 We also estimate models with additional control variables, described in more detail later. 6 A more formal approach would estimate a true demand system, such as the AIDS or Rotterdam model (see Deaton and Muellbauer 1980 for more details), which would yield a direct estimate of the cross-price elasticity between health insurance and other goods. These models require data on the prices of each good, which we do not have. Facing this limitation, our approach is intended to provide a simple descriptive analysis of spending patterns rather than the rigorous test of economic theory represented by a true demand system.
7 As noted previously in note 2, higher prices mean higher spending if demand is inelastic with respect to own price. Most studies of housing demand find that it is inelastic (Hanushek and Quigley 1980) . 8 We also find that the uninsured spend more on ''other.'' To shed light on this result, we disaggregate spending in this category into its three main components: 1) cash contributions (alimony and child support, gifts of cash, stock or bonds [including support to college students], contributions to charities, schools, churches and political organizations); 2) mortgage principal payments for properties other than the main dwelling; and 3) true miscellany (membership fees for credit cards or shopping clubs, credit card interest, lotteries, legal fees [excluding real estate closing costs], funeral expenses, safe deposit boxes, checking account charges, cemetery lots, accounting fees, dating services, miscellaneous costs related to ownership of a second home, and occupational expenses). Although we do not report the result of these analyses in detail, we find that for low spenders, the differential is driven by significantly higher cash contributions ($40) and true miscellany ($40), while for high spenders it is driven by true miscellany ($500) and secondhome payments ($78). Note that since true miscellany includes credit card fees and interest, the higher spending of the uninsured in this category may reflect, in part, that they face higher prices for credit than the insured. 9 More specifically, we begin by keeping only households that report positive expenditures for new or used car purchases, which is about 10% of the sample in each year. This step of the analysis uses the standard CE measure of expenditures rather than outlays so that it reflects car purchase prices. We use this subsample to run a regression for each year predicting car expenditures as a function of quadratics in income and total non-car expenditures, weeks worked by household members, expenditures on gasoline, expenditures on public transportation, vehicle maintenance expenditures, the number of cars owned, region of residence, family composition, and age and education of the reference person. We use the coefficients from this regression to predict car spending for the entire sample (that is, including the observations that did not have any car purchase expenditures). Our measure of the consumption of services from cars is this predicted spending, times the number of cars the household owns, divided by 8 (reflecting the assumption that cars depreciate completely after eight years). On average, the annual flow of services from cars is estimated to be about $3,000 per car. Our transportation consumption measure, then, is the sum of car services and the other standard CE measures of transportation spending (gas, maintenance, insurance, repairs, vehicle rentals, and outlays on other vehicles [planes, motorcycles, etc.] ). 10 All models were re-estimated using total consumption, rather than total spending, as a control variable; none of the results for goods other than housing or transportation changed appreciably so those results are not reported here. 11 From a theoretical perspective, ''self-insuring'' is less desirable than buying insurance in a competitive market (that is, one that does not suffer from adverse selection) because it does nothing to reduce the risk associated with uncertain medical spending. In fact, a significant amount of self-insurance might be taken as suggestive evidence of adverse selection in insurance markets. 12 The differential for health insurance, which by definition must be negative, will be biased toward zero; while the estimated differential for medical care, which may be either positive or negative, will be biased upward. 13 Essentially all respondents except those in the smallest PSUs reside in MSAs, and nearly all respondents living in MSAs are coded by BLS as ''urban.'' Therefore we use the MSA variable to differentiate among respondents in the smallest PSU category, and use the BLS urban/rural variable to distinguish further among residents of the smallest PSUs who are also in non-MSA regions. 14 Note that in this story we also would expect the uninsured household to spend considerably more than the insured household on medical care; we see very little evidence of this in our data, especially considering the fact that medical spending in the CE represents total spending for the uninsured, but only out-ofpocket spending by the insured. 15 Poverty thresholds are 20% to 30% higher in Alaska and Hawaii, implicitly acknowledging the higher cost of living in these states.
